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Abstract
Using data from nationwide surveys of provincial institutions and private manu-
facturing small medium enterprises, this study provided the first evidence of the 
impact of provincial institution quality and firms’ participation in and intensity 
of corrupt activities on firm productivity in Vietnam. We found that the bribe 
intensity instead of whether firms bribed state officials or not (measured by a 
dummy variable) has a negative effect on firm productivity when the endogeneity 
of corruption and unobservable characteristics are controlled for. This finding 
contrasts to a popular belief about a paradox for East Asian countries where 
corruption is positively associated with firm growth.
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Resumen
Este trabajo es el primero en proveer evidencia del impacto de la calidad de las 
instituciones provinciales y la intensidad de la corrupción en la productividad 
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de las empresas en Vietnam. Para ello se utilizó información de encuestas na-
cionales de instituciones provinciales y empresas manufactureras. Controlando 
por la endogeneidad de la corrupción, se encuentra que la intensidad del uso 
de sobornos afecta negativamente a la productividad de las empresas. Estos 
resultados contrastan con la creencia popular que la corrupción y el crecimiento 
de las firmas están positivamente asociados.
Palabras clave: Corrupción, productividad de las empresas, PYME, Vietnam.
Clasificación JEL: C26; L25
1. Introduction
Corruption is a worldwide phenomenon, especially in the developing world, 
which many authors and theories offer various theoretical arguments toward 
the relationship between corruption and firm performance. On the one hand, 
resource-based perspectives argue that corruption may erode economic and 
social institutions and long term development. Specifically, it can destroy criti-
cal resources such as firms’ reputation, impeding the efficient allocations of 
resources, and an enterprise’s culture (Hung, 2008; Lou, 2002). Consequently, 
it may drive profit away from firms, and talent, technological advancement and 
innovation are not sufficiently valued. Firms are dis-incentivized to invest for 
growth and improve productivity (Murphy, Shleifer, & Vishny, 1993). Corruption 
in such case is considered as ‘sand-in-the-machine’ (Ades & Di Tella, 1996). 
In addition, corruption may prevent the entry of new firms because incumbents 
tend to exploit their existing corrupt relationship. Corrupt officials try to delay 
transactions to receive more bribes from public service users (Rose-Ackerman, 
1997). Public resources would then be misallocated, not to the-best-users who 
can offer the best value for money for society instead to whom who offer the 
highest bribes (Jain, 2001).
On the other hand, the literature has often found a theoretically puzzling posi-
tive relationship between corruption and firm productivity, which defies intuition 
and parallel evidence. For instance, rent-seeking views reveal that engagement 
in corruption can help firms save time and allows firms to get things done or 
to overcome bureaucratic administrative processes and unclear or complicated 
regulations (e.g., Lui, 1985). Firms pay bribes to speed things up or “grease the 
wheels” which then promotes the growth of firms. 
 In another way, the institutional theory is recognized as one of the most 
popular perspectives to explain firm behavior in the transitional economies 
(e.g., Hoskisson, Eden, Lau, & Wright, 2000; Wright, Filatotchev, Hoskisson, 
& Peng, 2005). This approach indicates that corruption may not affect firm ef-
ficiency. Because corruption is simply an entry cost to join an established game 
and helps firms survive in their environment (North, 1990). When neighboring 
firms take part in corruption, other firms are under pressure to act in similar 
ways. Consequently, corruption is a common practice and has little effect on 
their productivity.
While theoretical arguments are clear, empirical studies have not been 
reached a consensus. Early studies of the effects of corruption on economic ef-
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ficiency used cross country macro data (e.g., Pierre-Guillaumeméon & Sekkat, 
2005). However, firm heterogeneity may affect firm productivity and innovation 
when the heterogeneity is able to be controlled for at an aggregate level data 
(Kasahara & Rodrigue, 2008). Furthermore, Halpern, Koren, and Szeidl (2005) 
show that the studies at the macro-level may suffer from omitted variables and 
reverse causality bias.
With the availability of firm-level data, recent research has emphasized the 
relationship between corruption and growth at the firm level (e.g., Faruq, Webb, 
& Yi, 2013). However, the evidence is mixed. For example, while De Rosa, 
Gooroochurn, and Görg (2013) found a negative relationship between firm 
productivity and corruption in European countries, other studies in East Asian 
countries (e.g., Vial & Hanoteau, 2010) reveal a positive link. There is limited 
evidence in transitional economies where corruption is likely widespread, this 
motivates us to pursue this topic in a transitional economy of Vietnam. 
In the study, we re-examine this question for the case of Vietnam because 
of three reasons. First, although there are few studies in Vietnam on general 
corruption topic (e.g., Nguyen & Van Dijk, 2012), there is no empirical evi-
dence of the impact of bribe on firm productivity in Vietnam. Hence, our study 
provides the first evidence of the impact of corruption on firm productivity in 
Vietnam. Second, though the anti-corruption and anti-waste laws and various 
anti-corruption campaigns have been in place, bribes to public officials remain 
a major challenge for business environment in Vietnam. The frequency and 
size of bribes have remained at high levels (Edmund Malesky, 2009). While the 
Communist Party and the government has publicised its anti-corruption efforts, 
the country has made a very little progress in the corruption rankings. Indeed, the 
recent Transparency International report in 2014 shows that Vietnam achieved 
a score of 3.1 out of 10 (or 119 out of 177 countries). There is no improvement 
in score during last three years and a score of 3.1 remained unchanged. Vietnam 
was ranked even behind the Philippines and Indonesia where corruption is very 
severe. Furthermore, a high quality data on corruption and institutional quality at 
provincial level and firm productivity is available, making this study possible.1 
There are several empirical challenges when considering the impact of cor-
ruption on firm productivity. For instance, most of previous studies measure 
bribes as a dummy variable, and this measurement cannot capture the severity 
or level of corruption very well. To deal with this limitation, this study uses 
both measures. In addition, corruption may be potentially endogenous that may 
bias the results in the available empirical evidence. We tried to overcome the 
methodological challenges by using IV approach in which we predict the amount 
of bribe paid by firms or the likelihood of paying bribe by using the expected 
amount of bribe by industry in each province within a year.
The paper is structured as follows. Next section presents a theoretical discus-
sion for potential impacts of corruption and institutional quality on firm growth. 
Section 3 presents data and methodology. Empirical results are presented in 
section 4, and finding summary and conclusion is in the last section.
1 More details about the data, please see part 3.1 
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2. Corruption and the role of institutional quality in the linkage 
between corruption and firm performance
Corruption is widely defined as the abuse of power by public officials for 
private gains (Svensson, 2005). Corruption is an outcome of non-transparent 
legal, economic and political institutions, and affects business and economic 
development. Corruption is a result of incomplete monitoring and bad or inef-
ficient policies. Firms who want to overcome the barriers and speed up their 
business process are willing to pay bribes. Following Rand and Tarp (2012), in 
the current study, bribe is measured as a dummy variable based on the question 
whether firms paid informal or communication fees, while the ratio of bribe pay-
ment amount relative to firm revenue is used to measure the intensity of bribe.
When considering the role of corruption on firm productivity, the provincial 
institutional quality is also controlled for in our study because of several reasons. 
First, Méon and Weill (2010) examined a sample of 69 countries and found that 
corruption is less harmful to efficiency in countries where institutions are less 
effective. It may even be positively associated with efficiency in countries where 
institutions are extremely ineffective. They concluded that corruption is ‘‘grease 
the wheels”. Other studies also reached a consensus that at a higher corruption 
level, corruption may be correlated with poor institution, corruption greases the 
wheel of efficiency but at a lower level of corruption (higher CPI-Corruption 
Perception Index), corruption and economic efficiency go in reverse directions 
(e.g., Halkos & Tzeremes, 2010). 
Similarly, the recent literature also notes that the estimated effect of bribe 
on firm productivity growth may be biased if institutional quality factor is not 
taken into account. The institutional quality may affect the relationship between 
corruption and firm level productivity (Faruq et al., 2013).
Also, each province in Vietnam has many disparities in business culture and 
economic development. They have autonomy to implement or practise policies 
and regulations even the central government has unique laws/regulations for all 
regions/provinces. The provinces implement central government’s laws in dif-
ferent ways (Malesky, 2004, 2008). Laws in Vietnam are often ambiguous and 
explained in different ways. Furthermore, the development in institutions across 
provinces has been uneven. For example, some provinces have made significant 
improvement in economic governance, business and investment environment, 
while other provinces lag behind and are very bureaucratic (Malesky, 2007). 
3. Data Sources and empirical methods
3.1. Data sources
This study utilises two data sources. The first data are obtained from the 
Small and Medium Enterprise Survey in Vietnam, which were conducted in 
2005, 2007, 2009 and 2011 by the Institute of Labour Science and Social 
Affairs, the Central Institute for Economic Management in collaboration with 
the University of Copenhagen. The survey used the same questionnaire over the 
years and covered private manufacturing firms in ten provinces in the South, 
Central and North regions of Vietnam. The data offer an unbalanced dataset of 
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more than 10,000 observations. More detail of the data can be seen in Rand and 
Tarp (2012) and Vu, Holmes, Lim, and Tran (2014).2
The second data source is from a survey of the Vietnam aggregated 
Provincial Competitiveness Index (PCI), which were conducted by the Vietnam 
Competitiveness Initiative in collaboration with the Vietnam Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry in the period 2005-11 for a purpose of evaluating 
institutional quality of provincial or local governments. The survey provides 
nine institutional sub-indices across years of the the period. These indices are 
: First, entry costs including (i) time for firm registration and land acquisition, 
(ii) time for firms to gain all the necessary licenses needed to start a business as 
well as the degree of difficulty to obtain such licenses/permits. Second, access to 
the acquired land and the security of business premises after land has had been 
acquired. Third, transparency and access to information, that is whether firms 
have access to proper planning and legal documents for running their business 
such as labour and training, whether new policies and laws are communicated 
to firms sufficiently and predictably implemented. Fourth, cost of time to deal 
with regulatory compliance measure e.g. bureaucratic compliance or decisions 
to implement local regulations. Fifth, informal charges measuring a firm’s per-
ception about the corruption from provincial officials. Sixth, distortion offering 
privileges to state owned enterprises e.g. incentives, policy, and access to capital 
and credit sources toward state-owned enterprises. Seventh, private sector devel-
opment designs services, provinces’ private sector business growth promotion 
programs, development of industrial zones and parks. Eighth, employment and 
worker training, those provincial authorities promote vocational training and 
skills development for local firms. Ninth, legal institutions measuring the trust 
from firms on provincial courts and contract enforcement. 
The combination of the SME survey and PCI survey offers a unique firm-
provincial level panel dataset. This panel dataset enables us to measure not only 
the impact of corruption at firm level but also the effects of institutional quality 
at the provincial level on firm productivity growth. The variables measured in 
monetary terms are deflated to 1994 constant prices using the GDP deflator. 
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics ofthe variables included in the models. 
Corruption index decreases considerably from 40.5% in 2005 to 26% in 2007. 
This is consistent with the decreasing trend for this period shown in Rand and 
Tarp (2012), which can be explained by effect of the anti-corruption law passed 
in 2005 and establishment of the National Anti-Corruption Committee in 2006. 
However, the bribe index experiences a significant increase again through rest 
of the study period. Our data also provide information about bribe purposes. 
The most common reason for giving bribes is to get connected with public ser-
vices. 25.82 % of the surveyed firms committed this sort of corruption, 25.31% 
of surveyed firms gave bribes to tax collectors, and 12.12 % of the firms used 
bribes to gain government contracts. Other reasons such as getting licenses and 
permit and dealing with customs make up 10.3%.
During the study period, while average labour experiences a slight decrease 
from 2.04 to 1.93, the capital of firms increases significantly in our sample in 
2 The data are shared kindly by Professor John Rand
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TABLE 1
STATISTICAL DESCRIPTION OF THE MAIN VARIABLES  
IN OUR REGRESSION ESTIMATIONS
Variables3
20054 2007 2009 2011
Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD
Value added (log)
(million VND)
 4.113 1.49 4.244 1.56 4.34 1.62 4.481 1.59
Firm-level variable
Bribe (Dummy) 0.405 0.49 0.26 0.44 0.34 0.47 0.38 0.48
Bribe intensity (Ratio) 0.002 0.008 0.0016 0.0149 0.0013 0.018 0.0011 0.004
Labour (log)
(number of employee)
2.04 1.12 2.05 1.12 2.05 1.14 1.93 1.13
Capital (log)
(million VND)
5.13 1.82 5.40 1.85 5.45 1.86 5.81 1.79
Innovation (Dummy) 0.67 0.47 0.48 0.50 0.45 0.49 0.44 0.49
Leverage (Ratio) 0.12 0.39 0.11 0.23 0.10 0.23 0.07 0.19
Institutional quality at 
province level
Entry cost 7.19 1.13 7.62 0.71 8.22 0.35 8.62 0.29
Land access 5.33 1.13 5.75 0.80 5.55 0.68 5.7 0.87
Transparency 5.83 1.17 6.07 0.79 5.9 0.33 5.96 0.43
Time cost 4.81 0.93 6.57 0.83 6.11 0.52 6.11 0.68
Informal charge 5.84 0.97 6.15 0.60 5.33 0.54 6.31 0.90
Proactive 4.79 1.51 4.96 1.24 3.76 0.83 4.19 0.98
Private act 5.69 1.62 5.87 1.93 6.29 1.21 5.68 1.37
Worker training 5.68 1.65 5.27 1.01 4.87 0.84 5.20 0.47
Legal framework 3.82 1.16 3.99 0.71 5.21 0.53 5.78 0.34
PCI 53.84 7.18 56.76 5.61 56.59 3.66 59.45 3.24
Observations 2695 2484 2515 2435
the same period. Innovation and leverage has the same trend with a decreasing 
trend in the period 2005-11.34
For institutional factors at the provincial level, we use both aggregated index 
(PCI) and several sub-indicators. Some sub-indicators increased significantly 
throughout the period, while other indices decreased slightly. For example, entry 
costs increased considerably from 7.19 in 2005 to 8.2 in 2011, but the index of 
worker training across provinces witnessed a slight decrease in the same period. 
3 1USD equated to about 16,000 VND; 17,000 VND; 19,000 VND and 20,000 VND in 
2005, 2007, 2009, 2011 respectively.
4 Provincial level indices of 2006 instead of 2005 are used because of two reasons. First, 
our focus is on 10 provinces, but PCI in 2005 did not survey some of these provinces. 
In addition, firm-level survey in 2005 was conducted from late October onwards. Thus 
using CPI of 2006 does match quite well with firm-level data of 2005.
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A partial correlation matrix for dependent and independent variables is 
reported in Table 2. The correlation coefficient between firm productivity and 
corruption is 0.38 and this tentatively supports the argument of the grease the 
wheel of corruption. In addition, firm characteristics such as innovation and 
leverage are also found to have a significant correlation with firm productivity 
growth. However, the correlation coefficient for innovation and leverage is very 
small (0.03 and 0.08, respectively). 
For institutional quality variables at the provincial level, it was found that 
many other explanatory variables are significantly correlated with the dependent 
variable except for the informal charge, proactive and legal framework.
The final row of Table 2 shows the partial correlation matrix between bribe 
intensity with other covariates in the model. While bribe intensity has a positive 
significant relationship with dependent variable, it has insignificant linkages 
with the majority of sub-indicators of institutional quality at the provincial level.
3.2. Empirical method and estimation issues
The impact of corruption on firm productivity is examined using an augmented 
Cobb-Douglas production function as the common specification in the literature. 
We conduct a one-stage productivity estimation procedure. This comes from 
several main reasons. First, usage of one-stage approach may avoid a debate 
about what the most suitable approach for calculating the productivity (Van, 
2003). In addition, the two step approach (e.g. Levinsohn and Petrin, 2003; 
Olley and Pakes, 1996) has some disadvantages such as identification and esti-
mation issues, although this approach may control for the endogeneity of input 
factors by using firm’s intermediate consumption (see more detailed discussion 
in Ackerberg et al, 2006; and Wooldridge, 2009). Furthermore, De Rosa et al. 
(2013) show that two-step approach is less efficient than one-step approach. 
Accordingly, we use the one-stage approach to estimate the linkage between 
firm productivity and corruption as below:
(1)   lnVAijt = α + β1Bribeitj + β2lnKijt + β3lnLijt + β4 Xijt + λt + λj+ λm + eijt 
where lnva is log value added of firm i in industry j at time t that is modelled 
with inputs of lnKijt (capital) and lnLijt (labour count), and bribe is the main 
variable of interest. Most of studies measure corruption as a dummy variable 
and this does not allow capturing the intensity of corruption well and hence, we 
use both in this study. We also include some firm-level characteristics includ-
ing leverage, measured by the ratio between total debts over total assets and 
innovation as these factors also affect firm productivity (e.g.,Griffith, Huergo, 
Mairesse, & Peters, 2006). Equation (1) also includes dummy variables for year 
(λt), industry λj , and location fixed effects (λm). 
In an extended specification, provincial level institutional quality indices are 
also controlled for as discussed earlier regarding the role of institutional quality).
(2)  lnVAijt = α + β1 Bribeijt + β2lnKijt + β3lnLijt + β4 Xijt +β5 Zijt + λt + λj+ λm + eijt
where Zijts are factors of institutional quality at the provincial level. Unobservable 
characteristics and potential endogeneity of the Bribe variable may cause the bias 
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in estimates from equation 2 when using OLS estimation (Fisman & Svensson, 
2007). Although some studies show that the endogeneity of corruption may not 
be a serious concern in Vietnam because of their measurement (e.g., Nguyen & 
Van Dijk, 2012). However, this may not be true in our case. Bribe is potentially 
endogenous since Rand and Tarp (2012) used the same dataset as ours show that 
corruption in Vietnam itself is determined by other factors. In addition, Asiedu 
and Freeman (2009) argue that when the data of corruption and firm productiv-
ity stemming from the same source at firm level would result in endogeneity 
problem. Hence, our identification strategy to deal with the potential endogeneity 
of bribe is to use industry-location averages of corruption as an instrumental 
variable as suggested by Fisman and Svensson (2007). Accordingly, firm’s bribe 
payments include two elements: 
(3)  bijt = Bijt + Bjt 
While Bijt is payments of firm i in industry j at time t by idiosyncratic 
reasons, Bjt is the share of payments by reasons relating to specific sector in 
a certain geographical location at time t. We conduct two-stage empirical 
estimation procedure. First, the location-industry average bribe payment (Bjt) 
along with other exogenous variables are used to estimate the fitted values 
for bijt.. Then, we model firm productivity growth as a function of the fitted 
values from the first-stage regression and other exogenous variables as seen 
in equations (4) and (5).
(4)  bijt = f(Bjt, lnKijt, lnLijt, Xijt, Zijt ) 
(5)  Lnvaijt = f( bˆ ijt, lnKijt, lnLijt, Xijt, Zijt) 
As shown in Fisman and Svensson (2007), the use of industry-location aver-
age as an instrument not only overcomes the potential endogeneity of corruption, 
the bias from unobservables, but also mitigates measurement error in the data. 
We therefore employ the IV-fixed effect approach to address the potential bias 
caused by both time-invariant unobservable characteristics and the potential 
endogeneity of bribe (Vial & Hanoteau, 2010).
4. Empirical results and discussions
We start modelling with contemporary variables to provide some baseline 
estimates. The OLS and FE models are used. As shown in column 1 of Table 3, 
there is a positive and significant linkage between bribe payment and firm pro-
ductivity growth at the one percent level. The estimated coefficient indicates 
that firms with corruption behaviour have higher productivity than those without 
paying bribe. This finding is in line with recent results for many East Asian coun-
tries when firm productivity increases despite widespread corruption (e.g., Vial 
& Hanoteau, 2010 for Indonesia). However, the results contrast to the findings 
by Fisman and Svensson (2007) for African firms. Such mixed results imply 
that this initial observation by OLS can be biased stemming from unobservable 
factors or the potential endogeneity problem of corruption. 
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TABLE 3
BASELINE ESTIMATIONS:  
THE IMPACT OF CORRUPTION ON FIRM PRODUCTIVITY
Variables
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Pooled OLS FE FE FE FE
Bribe 0.1244** 0.0768** 0.0768** 0.0832**
(0.015) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Bribe intensity –0.9078+
(0.530)
Ll 0.9305** 0.7145** 0.7144** 0.7154** 0.7208**
(0.009) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017)
Lk 0.1727** 0.0925** 0.0924** 0.0859** 0.0879**
(0.006) (0.009) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007)
Leverage 0.2541** 0.0623* 0.0622* 0.0610* 0.0607*
(0.048) (0.028) (0.028) (0.028) (0.027)
Innovation 0.1425** 0.0814** 0.0814** 0.0873** 0.0940**
(0.014) (0.016) (0.016) (0.016) (0.017)
Entry cost 0.0088 0.0144
(0.017) (0.017)
Land access 0.0077 0.0057
(0.014) (0.015)
Transparency –0.0013 0.0037
(0.014) (0.014)
Time cost –0.0924** –0.0911**
(0.015) (0.015)
Informal 
charge
0.0213 0.0189
(0.018) (0.018)
Proactive 0.0200* 0.0172+
(0.010) (0.010)
Private act 0.0303** 0.0264**
(0.009) (0.009)
Labour 
training
–0.0371* –0.0338*
(0.016) (0.016)
Legal 
framework
0.0531** 0.0506**
(0.016) (0.017)
Urban dummy 0.3506** 0.3102*
(0.015) (0.129)
PCI 0.0001
(0.002)
Constant 1.0823** 1.9190** 2.0497** 2.0280** 2.0136**
(0.030) (0.086) (0.101) (0.087) (0.104)
Observations 10,033 10,033 10,033 10,033 10,033
R-squared 0.817 0.311 0.311 0.321 0.319
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of value added. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Models are 
controlled for year dummies, urban dummy and technological level dummies.
Corruption, provincial… / T. Quang T., V. Van H., D. Thanh T., T. Duc H. 209
To control for firm’s time-invariant unobserved features, we run the fixed 
effect estimations. As reported in column2 of Table 3, the sign of impact of 
corruption on firm productivity growth does not change, although the estimated 
coefficients are higher. We further control for intuitional quality factors at the 
provincial level, the estimated results are reported in column 3 of Table 3 for the 
aggregated index (PCI) and column 4 of Table 3 for sub-indexes of provincial 
institutional quality. The estimated coefficient of the corruption variable (Bribe) 
on firm productivity growth is still positive and statistically significant. However, 
if replacing bribe by bribe intensity, column 5 of Table 3 reveals a negative and 
significant linkage between bribe intensity and firm productivity.
As expected, innovation has a positive impact on firm productivity. For ex-
ample, column 2 Table 3 shows that innovators have 9 percent higher productivity 
than non-innovators, holding all other things constant. Leverage, as measured by 
the ratio between total debts over total assets, is also observed to be positively 
associated with firm productivity regardless of model specifications. This may 
be that firms with higher leverage face higher pressure.
It is worth noting that the results in Table 3 are still potentially biased due 
to the potential endogeneity of Bribes, which cannot be addressed by the fixed 
effects method. We therefore employ the instrumental variable fixed effect ap-
proach to control for both the endogeneity of bribe variable and unobservable 
time-invariant factors. The results of testing endogeneity of bribe and bribe 
intensity at the last line of Table 4 show that all P-values of the test are smaller 
ten percent, suggesting that the results in Table 3 are upward biased if the en-
dogeneity of Bribe and bribe intensity is not controlled for. 
We also conducted weak IV test to avoid the bias induced from weak instru-
ments. The values of Cragg-Donald Wald F statistics are 926, 926, 731, 346, 
346 and 301 for six model specifications in columns 1-6 of Table 4 respectively, 
which are greater than the reported Stock-Yogo’s weak identification critical 
value of 16.38. As a result, the variables of location-industry-year average of 
bribe and bribe intensity are valid IVs in our estimation
Interestingly, as reported in Table 4, a negative effect of a firm’s probability 
engaging into corruption on firm productivity is observed across all model 
specifications when we controlled for the endogeneity of corruption. However, 
the estimated coefficient becomes statistically insignificant. This result supports 
institutional perspectives. These results are also in line with recent findings that 
corruption is widespread among Vietnamese firms, and hence firms’ engagement 
in corruption has nothing to do with firm efficiency because it is considered as 
a norm among firms (DEPOCEN, 2012). Nevertheless, a corruption dummy 
variable is unable to capture the level of corruption. Hence, the intensity of cor-
ruption is considered in the next scenarios. The results are reported in the last 
columns 4, 5 and 6 of Table 4. Negative and significant impacts of the level of 
corruption on firm productivity are recorded through different specifications. 
This implies that the role of corruption on firm productivity can be clouded 
when measuring only bribe as a dummy variable.
Regarding the size of estimated coefficient of bribe intensity, it is the fact 
that the bribery dummy variable is not significant (in spite of the correct sign) 
signals that the bribe intensity coefficient may be small. Specifically, it is noted 
that the model is not a linear-linear form. Hence, the estimated coefficient of 
bribe intensity cannot be interpreted directly from the model. In this case, the 
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TABLE 4
IV-FIXED EFFECT ESTIMATIONS: THE IMPACT OF CORRUPTION  
ON FIRM PRODUCTIVITY5
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Bribe –0.0456 –0.0456 –0.0009
(0.046) (0.046) (0.050)
Bribe intensity –7.8637+ –7.8634+ –5.2354*
(4.630) (4.631) (2.437)
Ll 0.7227** 0.7226** 0.7210** 0.7177** 0.7177** 0.7198**
(0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019) (0.017)
Lk 0.0947** 0.0947** 0.0874** 0.0987** 0.0987** 0.0906**
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Leverage 0.0607* 0.0607* 0.0600* 0.0668* 0.0668* 0.0639*
(0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.029) (0.027)
Innovation 0.0896** 0.0898** 0.0930** 0.0960** 0.0960** 0.0989**
(0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017) (0.017)
Entry cost 0.0144 0.0147
(0.017) (0.017)
Land access 0.0057 0.0055
(0.015) (0.015)
Transparency 0.0039 0.0030
(0.014) (0.014)
Time cost –0.0913** –0.0904**
(0.015) (0.015)
Informal charge 0.0185 0.0205
(0.018) (0.018)
Proactive 0.0174+ 0.0161
(0.010) (0.010)
Private act 0.0267** 0.0246**
(0.009) (0.009)
Labour training –0.0343* –0.0314+
(0.016) (0.016)
Legal framework 0.0508** 0.0495**
(0.016) (0.017)
Urban dummy 0.3224* 0.3217* 0.3122* 0.3123*
(0.143) (0.144) (0.158) (0.158)
PCI 0.0002 –0.0000
(0.002) (0.002)
Observations 8,829 8,829 8,829 8,829 8,829 8,829
5 We further conduct robustness check of results by looking at several scenarios. First, we 
removed extreme outliers. The estimated results, reported in Table 4 column 3, change 
slightly, suggesting that the results are robust. We also further investigate the sensitivity 
of the coefficient by dropping innovation variable with an argument that innovation may 
be potentially endogenous. The negative effect of corruption on firm productivity growth 
is still observed.
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estimated coefficient is explained through the mean value approach. In our 
study, the mean value of bribe intensity for whole sample is 0.0015. Therefore, 
when bribe intensity increases 1% compared to the mean value, the productivity 
decreases by 0.0015*5.23% (=0.0078%) 0.0078%), keeping others constant. 
The change is relatively small.
The estimated results in columns 5 and 6 of Table 4 reveal that while the 
aggregated index (PCI) of provincial institutional quality does not impact firm 
productivity, some provincial level sub-indices of institutional quality have 
significant impact on firm productivity. For example, time cost has a negative 
and significant impact on firm productivity. In addition, as expected, actions 
supporting private sectors (Private act) as well as a stable or reliable and clear 
legal framework help firms improve their productivity. Surprisingly, labour 
training has no impact on firm productivity, and this may be explained by the 
outdated education in Vietnam where theory is heavily focused while practical 
skills are hardly focused, quality of instructors is at warning low levels, and 
teaching equipment not updated.
5. Summary and conclusion
Unlike previous studies, this study considers for the first time the impact of 
corruption at both firm and provincial levels on firm productivity in Vietnam. 
Contrasting to a popular belief about a paradox for East Asian countries, our 
IV approach estimates reveal a negative impact of bribe intensity on private 
SMEs’ manufacturing productivity. However, the magnitude of the estimated 
effect is relatively small.
Some provincial institutional factors such as time costs and supporting ac-
tions for private sector are positively associated with firm productivity. This 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Instrumental Variables
location–
indus-
try–year 
average 
of bribe
location–
indus-
try–year 
average 
of bribe
location–
indus-
try–year 
average 
of bribe
location–
indus-
try–year 
average 
of bribe 
intensity
location–
indus-
try–year 
average 
of bribe 
intensity
location–
indus-
try–year 
average 
of bribe 
intensity
Weak identification 
test(Cragg-Donald 
Wald F statistic) 
[Stock-Yogo weak id 
test critical value at 10 
percent]
926.312
[16.38]
926.107
[16.38]
731.591
[16.38]
346.577
[16.38]
346.671
[16.38]
 301.392
[16.38]
Endogeneity test of 
Bribe and bribe inten-
sity (P-value)
0.004 0.004 0.07 0.001 0.001 0.067
Notes: The dependent variable is the natural log of value added. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. + significant at 10%; * significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%. Models are 
controlled for year dummies and technological level dummies.
Table 4 (continuation)
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implies that simplification of procedure to save time for enterprises, increasing 
actions to support private sectoea are necessary to improve productivity of firms
The finding of a co-movement between a low corruption level and the 
improvement in firms’ productivity implies that fights against corruption are 
necessary for the development of SMEs. Campaigns have been seen for many 
years, but did not work well, political efforts and willingness from central gov-
ernment particularly from the Communist Party is crucial. A transparent legal 
framework and effective enforcement should be promoted and put in place in 
order to curb corruption and level of corruption.
This paper used data from manufacturing SMEs, so its findings may not be 
represented for whole economy as well as large enterprises who own different 
resources and business behaviours including markets and negotiating powers. 
Further extension of this research to other larger firms and other sectors beyond 
manufacturing is necessary to make a general conclusion about the relationship 
between corruption and firm productivity. Finally, there is a need for future 
research to apply in other transitional economies using the same methodology 
employed in the paper to see whether a negative relationship between corruption 
and firm productivity is found consistently beyond Vietnam.
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Appendix I: List of the industries by level of technology
Group 1: Low technology
D15: Food and beverages
D16: Cigarettes and tobacco
D17: Textile products
D18: Wearing apparel, dressing and dying of fur
D19: Leather and products of leather; leather substitutes; footwear.
D20: Wood and wood products, excluding furniture
D21: Paper and paper products
D22: Printing, publishing, and reproduction of recorded media
D23: Coke and refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel
D36: Furniture and other products not classified elsewhere
D37: Recycles products
Group 2: Medium technology
D24: Chemicals and chemical products
D25: Rubber and plastic products
D26: Other non-metallic mineral products
D27: Iron, steel and non-ferrous metal basic industries
D28: Fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment
Group 3: High technology
D29: Machinery and equipment
D30: Computer and office equipment
D31: Electrical machinery apparatus, appliances and supplies
D32: Radios, television and telecommunication devices
D33: Medical equipment, optical instruments
D34: Motor vehicles and trailers
D35: Other transport equipment

